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I
N THE PAST YEAR, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has taken a series of
significant steps aimed at abolishing the death penalty
throughout Africa. In its 37th Ordinary Session, held from
April 27 - May 11, 2005, the African Commission passed a reso-
lution creating a Working Group on the Death Penalty with the
aim of devising a plan to eliminate capital punishment in Africa.
During its November - December 2005 session, the Commission
passed a second resolution naming two commissioners and five
experts to represent the five regions of Africa as members of the
Working Group.1 This second resolution stressed that there was a
growing trend against the use of capital punishment in interna-
tional law and mandated the Working Group to develop a report
on the issue and a strategic plan for abolishing the practice.2
Although the African Commission’s actions are encouraging, it
remains to be seen what effects they will have on states that insist
the death penalty is a viable form of punishment. 
Africa is an incredibly diverse continent. With 53 national
governments and several thousand ethnic cultures, it is nearly
impossible to determine an “African” view on any single topic, yet
empirical evidence demonstrates that there is growing support for
abolishing the death penalty. Of the 53 states in Africa, 13 have
abolished the death penalty for all crimes.3 Of the 40 states that
retain the death penalty in law, half are considered “abolitionist in
practice” because they have not executed a single individual in the
past decade and are believed to have an official or unofficial mora-
torium on executions.4 Unfortunately, 20 African states maintain
the use of the death penalty as a viable form of punishment for at
least some crimes.5
Even if the African Commission ultimately issues a resolution
recommending that African governments abolish the death penal-
ty, it is questionable whether it would have any real effect. African
Commission resolutions are non-binding. Any government that
would be willing to follow the recommendation would still have to
navigate its own domestic political process to remove the death
penalty from its constitution or legal code. Fortunately, the expe-
riences of African states that have recently abolished the death
penalty demonstrate that strong and effective leadership can affect
significant change on a national scale. As this article will show,
African states that have abolished the death penalty have done so
in three ways: through legislation, through judicial rulings, or
through executive action. Public and private movements that are
trying to influence change in retentionist countries can learn much
from these examples.
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S POWER TO “RECOMMEND”
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU), the precursor
to the African Union (AU), unanimously adopted the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) in
1981.6 The signatories intended it to be the mechanism for pro-
tecting human rights on the continent, and it was the first limita-
tion on the national authority of the States Parties with respect to
human rights.7 Article 30 of the African Charter established the
African Commission to “promote human and peoples’ rights and
ensure their protection in Africa.” Since its inauguration in 1987,
however, the African Commission’s power to “promote” and “pro-
tect” has proven limited.
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS
The African Commission has a mandate to study human
rights issues, develop reports and recommendations to African gov-
ernments, and generally promote a dialogue on human rights
through conferences and symposia.8 It is under this rubric that the
African Commission created the Working Group on the Death
Penalty. Under Article 45(1)(b) of the African Charter, the
Commission must “formulate and lay down principles and rules
aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples’
rights and fundamental problems upon which African govern-
ments may base their legislation.”9
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
The African Commission has the power to hear “communi-
cations” or complaints filed by states, individuals, or non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) that are petitioning the
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“Given the weak enforcement power of the African Commission
… and its continued rationalization of the ‘legality’ of the death
penalty, any real change in the laws will have to come on a
national level. In states that have strong retentionist attitudes, this
will likely be an uphill battle.”
Commission for a ruling on an alleged violation of the African
Charter. Based on these communications, the Commission issues
a report outlining its findings and makes “such recommendations as
it deems fit” to the governments concerned and the AU10 (empha-
sis added). Under the communication system, the African
Commission has no power to enforce any remedy for violations.
Although the Commission may use public pressure to influence a
state’s actions, states are not obligated to comply with its recom-
mendations and many do not.
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S HISTORY
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S recent resolutions establishing the
Working Group on the Death Penalty and creating its mandate are
not the first instances in which the Commission has addressed cap-
ital punishment. The African Commission first adopted a resolu-
tion encouraging African states to abolish the death penalty in
1999. That resolution called upon “all States parties that still main-
tain the death penalty to: a) limit the imposition of the death
penalty only to the most serious crimes; b) consider establishing a
moratorium on executions of death penalty; [and] c) reflect on the
possibility of abolishing death penalty.”11 Although the resolution
was encouraging for death penalty abolitionists, its tentative lan-
guage did little to influence government action. 
Even with these public comments against the death penalty,
the African Commission itself has ruled that the death penalty,
when administered within a fair and proper domestic penal sys-
tem, is not a violation of the African Charter and thus is legally
acceptable. Article 4 of the African Charter reads, “Human beings
are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for
his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily
deprived of this right.”12 In the case of Forum of Conscience v. Sierra
Leone, the African Commission stated that “any violation of this
right without due process amounts to arbitrary deprivation of
life.”13 Thus, when a state follows proper judicial procedures and
protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the African Commission
does not consider a death sentence a violation of the African
Charter. Later, in the case of Interights et. al. (on behalf of Mariette
Sonjaleen Bosch) v. Botswana, the Commission found that the
accused had not been deprived of due process within the Botswana
judicial system and that her death sentence did not violate Article
4 of the African Charter.14
It is commendable that the African Commission is willing to
tackle this important and controversial topic. The Working
Group’s efforts will bring much-needed discussion of the death
penalty and, conceivably, some public pressure on retentionist gov-
ernments. Given the weak enforcement power of the African
Commission, however, and its continued rationalization of the
“legality” of the death penalty, any real change in the laws will have
to come on a national level. In states that have strong retentionist
attitudes, this will likely be an uphill battle. 
SOUTH AFRICA: 
THE COURTS ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY
FOR MUCH OF ITS APARTHEID HISTORY, South Africa was one of
the world leaders in state-sanctioned executions. In the 1980s,
1,109 prisoners were hanged by the South African government.15
In 1993, following the end of apartheid, the Republic of South
Africa approved a new interim Constitution, Section 11(2) of
which provided for the right to life.16 Death penalty opponents
argued that it was at odds with the 1977 law authorizing capital
punishment, and the issue eventually went to court.17
In its 1996 decision in State v. Makwanyane, South Africa’s
Constitutional Court abolished capital punishment by holding
that the death penalty was an unconstitutional violation of the
right to life. Justice Chaskalson, writing for a unanimous court,
reasoned, “[R]etribution cannot be accorded the same weight
under our Constitution as the rights to life and dignity … It has
not been shown that the death sentence would be materially more
effective to deter or prevent murder than the alternative sentence
of life imprisonment would be.”18
When the current Constitution was approved in 1996, South
Africa’s Parliament retained the “right to life” provision from the
interim Constitution. Parliament’s inclusion of that provision in the
new Constitution thereby placed a legislative stamp of approval on
the Court’s ruling. Ten years after the abolition of the death penal-
ty and despite the call of some political and public interest groups
to reinstate capital punishment in the face of an ever-increasing
crime rate, the decision has not been seriously challenged.
SENEGAL: 
THE LEGISLATURE ABOLISHES THE DEATH PENALTY
IN DECEMBER 2004, SENEGAL’S Parliament overwhelmingly
passed legislation that abolished the use of the death penalty.
Although the bill enjoyed strong support from large segments of
society, it also sparked vigorous social and religious debate
throughout the country. Leading opposition to the bill was one of
Senegal’s most influential Muslim organizations, the Coalition of
Islamic Associations (CAI). CAI’s leadership argued that the
Qur’an expressly allows for the death penalty and insisted that its
retention was necessary to deter crime.19 In a country with a pop-
ulation that is 95 percent Muslim and where crime was on the rise,










In response, proponents of the bill argued that the rise in
crime was occurring despite the possibility of a death penalty sen-
tence for convicted individuals. They pointed out that increased
levels of unemployment, especially among youth, was the most like-
ly cause of high crime rates. Retaining the death penalty, which was
reserved primarily for murder, would do little to deter the assaults
and robberies that made up the bulk of the increase in crime.
Moreover, although religion played a large part in Senegalese socie-
ty, proponents of the bill insisted that the death penalty was con-
trary to the values of traditional Senegalese culture.20
Since Senegal gained independence in 1960, the government
has executed only two people, both in 1967. At the time of these
executions, large numbers of religious and traditional leaders lob-
bied for clemency and noted that the death penalty violated the
Senegalese peoples’ belief that life was sacred. From 1967-2003
courts in Senegal refrained from handing down death sentences. In
2003, however, a court sentenced a man to death after convicting
him of murdering a soldier.21 Courts handed down three more
death sentences in 2004.
When Senegal’s Constitution was reformed in 2001, many
human rights activists had pushed the government to include a
provision outlawing the death penalty. President Abdoulaye Wade,
however, was among those who resisted its complete abolition.22 In
the end, Article 7 of the new Constitution stated that all human
life is sacred and inviolable, that the government has a responsibil-
ity to protect human life, and that every individual has “the right
to life, liberty, security, freedom of personal development, [and]
bodily integrity.”23 Although the Constitution made no exception
to this right to life, the death penalty remained in the legal code.
The revived use of death sentences from 2003-2004 sparked
a national debate. Many who had previously supported the reten-
tion of the death penalty, including President Wade, changed their
views. In July 2004, following an apparent change of heart and
with four prisoners sitting on death row, President Wade’s govern-
ment drafted a death penalty abolition bill and presented it to
Parliament.24 After several months of consideration, lawmakers
approved the bill, which eliminated the death penalty and affirmed
that all human life in Senegal was sacred and inviolable. 
LIBERIA: EXECUTIVE
ACTION ABOLISHES THE DEATH PENALTY
LIBERIA BECAME THE MOST RECENT African state to abolish the
death penalty when interim President Gyude Bryant endorsed
Liberia’s accession to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Second Optional Protocol on September 16,
2005.25 This Protocol abolishes the death penalty within the terri-
tories of all countries that sign or accede to it. Because Liberia
acceded to the treaty, it required no further domestic ratification
by the National Assembly. Thus, its prohibition against the death
penalty for all crimes immediately became binding.
Prior to the 2004 peace deal that brought Bryant to power as
interim President, Liberia had been involved in a bloody and grue-
some civil war for over a decade. The UN-backed Special Court for
Sierra Leone has indicted Liberia’s previous President Charles Taylor
for war crimes and crimes against humanity for his part in perpet-
uating civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone. Under the Taylor
regime, the death penalty was a possible punishment for murder,
armed robbery, terrorism, high treason, and gang rape if the rapist
inflicted serious injury on the victim.26 There were 14 official exe-
cutions in Liberia in 2000, the last year any executions were report-
ed. Many accuse Taylor’s regime of executing hundreds of people
outside of any formal judicial process. As Bryant and his transition-
al government set about rebuilding Liberia, the death penalty did
not receive much public attention. Moreover, there is little record
of any public debate on whether to abolish the death penalty prior
to Liberia’s accession to the Second Optional Protocol. 
Following the country’s abolition of the death penalty, a new
bill that sought to criminalize all forms of rape (at the time only
gang rape was considered illegal) contained a provision for the
death penalty in extreme cases. This ignited debate on the need for
the death penalty and called into question its abolition under the
Protocol. Although many human rights activists praised the bill’s
clarifications of the definitions of rape and sexual assault and
applauded the bill’s commitment to combating impunity for sexu-
al crimes, many felt the inclusion of a death penalty went too far.
As Dr. Charlotte Abaka, the United Nations Independent Expert
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Liberia,
explained, reinstituting a death penalty in the law will place Liberia
in conflict with its international treaties and could open it to com-
plaints before the international community.27
Ultimately, women’s rights groups and the Ministry of
Gender, eager to end debate on the bill and enshrine some protec-
tion for the women of Liberia, pushed to have the death penalty
provision, as well as several other controversial clauses, removed
from the bill.28 The National Transitional Legislative Assembly
passed the amended rape law in December 2005 and the death
penalty remains illegal in Liberia.29
BOTSWANA: THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING A
RETENTIONIST GOVERNMENT
DESPITE THE SUCCESSES SOME AFRICAN states have made in abol-
ishing the death penalty, many states continue to cling to the death
penalty as a viable form of punishment. Botswana, often hailed as
one of Africa’s most successful democracies, is a staunch defender
of capital punishment. Although Section 4 of Botswana’s





















Status of the death penalty by country.
of his life intentionally,” it contains an exception for the death
penalty.30 This exception is further codified in the Botswana Penal
Code, which allows for a death sentence in cases of murder, trea-
son, and assault with intent to murder during piracy.31
Since gaining independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana
has executed 38 individuals. The most recent executions took place
on September 19, 2003, when the government of Botswana
hanged three men. Government media made the announcement
after the men had been executed and buried. The men’s families
and attorneys were not informed of the executions prior to the
radio announcement. Although no such notification is required
under Botswana law, the men’s attorneys had been preparing an
application for clemency to Botswana’s President. President Festus
Mogae apparently signed the men’s death sentences without wait-
ing for the application.32
BOTSWANA’S ABOLITION MOVEMENT
There is strong public support in Botswana for the death penal-
ty. Prior to 1997 there was little debate on this issue. That year,
DITSHWANELO, Botswana’s only domestic NGO focusing exclu-
sively on human rights issues, began a national campaign against the
death penalty entitled “Who Has the Right to Kill?” As the debate
gained momentum, it became clear that there was widespread oppo-
sition to abolishing the death penalty. Opinion letters in local news-
papers and calls to radio talk shows demonstrated the outrage many
people felt at the idea of eliminating capital punishment. 
The movement became front-page news in 1999 when
DITSHWANELO and its partner attorneys succeeded in convinc-
ing Botswana’s High Court to issue a stay of execution for two
defendants, Tlhabologang Maauwe and Gwara Motswetla, just
hours before the men were scheduled to be hanged. This was the
first time any judicial authority had intervened on behalf of a con-
demned prisoner once the president had signed the death warrant.
In the months that followed, DITSHWANELO and its attorneys
demonstrated to the High Court that a serious error in the appeals
process had deprived the men of a fair trial. As a result, the court
set aside the convictions and death sentences and ordered a new
trial.33 By March 2005, with both men still in prison and the gov-
ernment unready or unwilling to proceed with a trial,
DITSHWANELO and its attorneys convinced the High Court
that the men’s constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial had
been violated again. Noting that the men had been in prison with-
out trial for more than five years, the judge vacated the murder
charges and ordered Maauwe and Motswetla released.34
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION AFFIRMS THE USE OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN BOTSWANA
The issue of how Botswana imposes the death penalty came
before the African Commission in 2001. Interights, a British
human rights NGO, sent a communication to the African
Commission objecting to a death sentence the Botswana courts
had handed down against Mariette Bosch in 1999. Although the
African Commission has never found that the death penalty vio-
lates the African Charter, Interights claimed that the secrecy sur-
rounding executions in Botswana and the lack of transparency in
the clemency process made the imposition of the death penalty
arbitrary and violated Article 4 of the Charter.35 In response to the
communication, the African Commission wrote to the President
of Botswana on March 27, 2001, and requested a stay in Bosch’s
execution until the Commission could rule on the matter. The
Commission never received a reply and officials in Botswana
hanged Bosch five days later.36
Despite the death of its client, Interights continued with the
case in the hopes of effecting some change in Botswana. In its final
decision, the African Commission emphasized that international
law was increasingly opposed to the use of the death penalty and it
encouraged all States Parties, including Botswana, to refrain from
use of the death penalty. Ultimately, however, the Commission
upheld the legality of the death penalty under the African Charter
and ruled that the secrecy of executions and the clemency process
did not make the deprivation of life arbitrary under the African
Charter because the sentence was the result of a fair trial.
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
Armed with the African Commission’s decision, Botswana’s
government maintains that the death penalty is a valid form of pun-
ishment. It often cites strong public support for capital punishment
as justification for continuing the practice. Given its history of lim-
ited cooperation with the African Commission, it is doubtful that
Botswana would change its policies even if the African Commission
issued a formal recommendation that States Parties reform their
domestic legislation to eliminate all use of capital punishment.
This does not mean, however, that the fight for abolition is
over. DITSHWANELO and other domestic and international
groups continue to advocate for an end to the death penalty in
Botswana. Further, despite the retentionist stance of Botswana’s
public and the executive branch of government, the courts in
Botswana have demonstrated that they are willing and able to place
some limits on the unfettered use of the death penalty. Although
the courts cannot eliminate the practice because it is legitimized by
the Constitution, they can ensure that capital crimes are tried
under the strictest of scrutiny and that the government fulfills its
obligations to conduct fair and speedy trials. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
EVEN WHEN THERE IS A STRONG MOVEMENT to abolish the death
penalty in one branch of government, a cooperative effort is often
necessary to ensure that capital punishment is eliminated perma-
43
“The African Commission
must adopt a clear and
unequivocal stance that no
state should be able to deprive
anyone of the right to life,
regardless of whether it is
arbitrary or accomplished
through due process.”
nently. Although South Africa’s Constitutional Court abolished
the death penalty, it was the Parliament’s approval of the decision
and its incorporation of the decision’s founding principles into the
new Constitution that assured the decision’s finality. In Senegal the
legislature ultimately abolished the death penalty, but the
President’s support was instrumental in combating opposition to
the bill. Finally, although the Liberian interim President’s accession
to an international treaty eliminated capital punishment, it took
cooperation among various NGOs, governmental ministries, and
the National Assembly to ensure that new laws allowing for the
death penalty were not passed. 
In several African states, some government sectors have dis-
played strong anti-death penalty sentiments, but a lack of cooper-
ation from other branches has hampered abolition movements. In
Nigeria, despite President Olusegun Obasanjo’s anti-death penalty
stance and an executive branch recommendation that all execu-
tions in Nigeria be put on hold until major judicial reforms can be
made, the courts continue to hand down death sentences and the
legislature has failed to address the issue.37 Similarly, despite a leg-
islative requirement that the government of Sierra Leone imple-
ment recommendations from the country’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the President’s office flatly
rejected a TRC recommendation that the death penalty be abol-
ished without delay.38
The African Commission’s decision to create a Working
Group on the Death Penalty is a commendable step along the road
toward abolishing the death penalty throughout Africa. The
African Commission, however, needs to go beyond merely recom-
mending that the death penalty be abolished if it truly hopes to
create change. It must publicly insist that States Parties initiate a
concerted campaign to pressure national governments to reform
their domestic legislation. Moreover, under its promotion author-
ity in the African Charter, the African Commission should urge
the AU to amend the African Charter to eliminate the word “arbi-
trary” from Article 4. The African Commission must adopt a clear
and unequivocal stance that no state should be able to deprive any-
one of the right to life, regardless of whether it is arbitrary or
accomplished through due process. 
Ultimately, much of the struggle against the death penalty
will be fought on the national level. As the success in some
African states demonstrates, cooperation among various private
actors and branches of governments is needed to affect perma-
nent change. Anti-death penalty groups that are able to create or
identify allies in several government sectors are likely to see more
success than those who concentrate all their efforts on a narrow
target. Concededly, a multi-sector approach can be more diffi-
cult, but as a Malawian proverb states, “You cannot pick up a
pebble with one finger.” HRB
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